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Abstract 
The inability of Australian federal governments to dominate the Senate has enhanced 
the Senate 's ability to review and make recommendations on public policy issues. In 
1994, the Senate Standing Committee on Industry, Science, Technology, Transport, 
Communications and Infrastructure reviewed and made recommendations on 
Australia's emergency management arrangements. Australian emergency 
management has developed in a complex environment where it has been heavily 
influenced by incremental development from its civil defence origins in the Second 
World War and by factors including international developments, federalism and the 
hazards i1t.1pacting on Australia. The Senate Committee's review was a unique 
opportunity for a high level investigation of the adequacy of the arrangements. The 
review, although it produced forty five recommendations, failed to consider a range 
of significant issues in Australian emergency management. These omissions include 
federalism, the impact of economic rationalism and the need for national emergency 
management legislation. The inquiry conducted by the Senate Committee failed to 
engage key stakeholders, notably local government and Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander communities. The inquiry also focused on administrative as opposed to 
policy issues. As a consequence of these deficiencies, it failed to result in significant 
change to Australia's emergency management arrangements. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
On the 15th of October 1992, the Senate agreed to a motion by Senator Dominic 
Foreman that the then Senate Standing Committee on Transport, Communications 
and Infrastructure conduct an inquiry into and report on: 
The capacity of public sector authorities to plan for, forecast and respond to 
major disasters and large-scale emergencies, fully respecting and utilising the 
skills and capabilities of volunteer organisations. (Foreman, 1992, p 1882) 
Over the next eighteen months, the Committee inquired into Australia's arrangements 
to cope with the impact of disasters on the community. On 29 June 1994, the Report 
of the inquiry (the Childs Report) was tabled in the Senate by the Committee's 
chairman, Senator Childs, although by this time the Committee's title and function 
had become the Standing Committee on Industry, Science, Technology, Transport, 
Communications and Infrastructure, hereafter the Senate Committee. 
During the inquiry, the Senate Committee held hearings across Australia, took 
evidence from numerous witnesses either in person at the hearings or from written 
submissions, visited facilities operated by state and federal governments and travelled 
to relatively remote locations such as the Bounty Gold Mine in Western Australia. 
The Childs Report presented forty-five recommendations for state and federal 
governments to contemplate and implement, but managed to avoid making any 
overall comment or recommendation on the effectiveness and suitability of 
Australia's arrangements to manage disasters and emergencies. 
Assessing the effectiveness of Australia's emergency management1 arrangements is 
an important task. Australia is subject to a wide range of natural and man-made2 
hazards, ranging from tropical cyclones, floods, earthquakes, industrial explosions, 
transportation accidents, exotic animal diseases and other calamities that can cause 
widespread deaths, injuries and property losses to affected communities. 
1 Emergency Management: 'The range of measures to manage risks to communities and the 
environment. It involves the development and maintenance of arrangements to prevent or mitigate, 
prepare for, respond to, and recover from emergencies and disasters in both peace and war.' National 
Emergency Management Committee (1996, p I). 
2 Attempts have been made to introduce gender-neutral alternatives to man-made, such as socially 
induced or socially created, but to date none have achieved any level of acceptance. For the purposes 
of this paper, man-made is used in a gender-neutral sense. See for example Department of Defence 
(1992) or Hood & Jackson (1991). 
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Neither the community nor government ignores these hazards. Australia has in place 
a complex set of arrangements, systems and organisations designed, either in whole 
or in part, to mitigate3 their adverse effects. Emergency services, such as the police, 
fire brigades, state emergency services and ambulance services react to disasters and 
emergencies to save life and protect property. Land-use controls exist in many 
locations to prevent development in flood prone areas. Building codes establish 
standards that enable buildings to resist the impact of earthquakes, fires and extreme 
winds. Government and philanthropic agencies such as Departments of human 
services, the Red Cross, Salvation Army and others provide financial and other 
assistance to disaster affected persons. Government agencies use licensing, standards 
and training to regulate activities such as the use of hazardous materials, operating 
aircraft and other transport services with the aim of minimising hazards to individuals 
and the community. 
However, Australia's arrangements are complicated by a federal system of 
government where responsibilities are split between levels of government and 
duplication, conflict and omission exist side by side. Recent trends in government 
across the world are adding to the complexity of the arrangements. The impact of 
managerialism and the public verses private enterprise debate are increasing 
uncertainty about the role of government during disaster. This is taking place during a 
period in which society's vulnerability to natural and man-made hazards is showing 
an upward trend. Urbanisation and rising populations put more people at risk and the 
demand for scarce land forces some lower socio-economic groups to live in at risk 
areas. Global warming and climate change may cause greater loss from 
meteorological phenomena while the failure of human technology such as nuclear 
power stations can cause tragedy on a huge scale (Chapman, 1 994a). 
The economic losses caused each year by disaster are significant. In 1 996, the dollar 
losses alone caused by natural hazards in Australia was estimated to be $1 .3 billion 
(Hodges, 1997), and this does not include the human cost of deaths and injury. In 
1 995, for example, tropical cyclone Bobby caused seven deaths, caused widespread 
flooding and cut Western Australia's road and rail links with the Eastern States for 
some days, resulting in disruption to sections of the economy reliant on these links 
3 Mitigate/Disaster Mitigation: 'Activities taken to eliminate or reduce the degree of risk to life and 
property from hazards, either prior to or following a disaster.' US National Fire Protection Association 
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(WA State Emergency Service, 1996). Reducing these costs through improved hazard 
management can benefit the whole community through lower insurance costs, lower 
demand on scarce public funds and less of the trauma (physical and mental) that 
results from deaths and injuries. 
In addition to the direct costs incurred responding to disasters and emergencies, 
substantial sums of money are spent each year providing emergency services and 
undertaking mitigation actions to minimise the impact of hazards. In 1996-97, for 
example, the national cost of providing fire services was estimated at $860 million 
(Steering Committee for the Review of Commonwealth/State Service Provision, 
1998, p 523). These sums of money represent scarce public resources that could be 
redirected to other activities or not spent at all if the adverse effects of hazards could 
be reduced through better management. 
In view of the gravity of Australian public policy for the management of emergencies 
and disasters, it is important that the arrangements are evaluated to ensure that the 
best possible outcomes are being achieved. This is both in terms of effectiveness, that 
is the ability to mitigate the adverse effects of hazards, and of efficiency; that is 
whether the funds spent are achieving the best return on investment. 
The need for evaluation of public policy is articulated by Wildavsky (1979, p 213) 
who argues that 'Evaluation should not only lead to finding better policy programs to 
accomplish objectives but also to altering objectives themselves.' Wildavsky argues 
that it is not enough to simply assess whether a program is meeting its objectives 
effectively and efficiently. Good evaluation also seeks not only to find better ways of 
achieving the objectives, but better objectives. Too often, the objectives become the 
end rather than the means to a greater community good. He also pointed out the need 
for evaluations to be 'External, multiple, independent, and continuous .... to avoid 
self-serving behavior.' Wildavsky (1979, p 6). Obstacles to good evaluations include: 
uncertain program objectives, selecting an inappropriate type of evaluation, self­
perpetuating policies, decentralisation, time and the obstacle of overcoming obstacles 
(Wildavsky, 1979, pp 215 -220). 
Palfrey, Phillips, Thomas and Edwards (1992), citing Goldberg and Connolly (1982), 
identify reasons why evaluations of public sector programs and activities are vital. 
cited by Yates (1997, p 25). 
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Evaluations are an important means of providing for public accountability, enabling 
effectiveness and efficiency to be measured and allowing judgments to be made on 
the allocation of resources. Evaluation also permits new ideas to be compared against 
proven methods, with the aim of reducing the risk of policy failure through 
implementation of incomplete or inadequately constructed new initiatives. 
Evaluations also allow assessment of the best ways and means of delivering public 
services by comparing different methods and techniques across the public sector. 
Palfrey, et al. (1992) also discuss obstacles to evaluation. They note that faults with 
the evaluation itself may exist through poor or inappropriate objectives, insufficient 
time, inadequate consultation and unrealistic recommendations. External to the 
evaluation itself are obstacles such as resistance to change, political interference, and 
failure to sell the results of the evaluation and the evaluation being seen as irrelevant 
by decision-makers. 
Mauch and Birch (1989) suggest that there are two approaches to the conduct of 
evaluations. The first approach evaluates the procedures used in a particular program 
to determine if the procedures are effective in enable the program to achieve its 
outcomes. Mauch and Birch (1989) describe this form of evaluati9n as formative. A 
formative evaluation attempts to provide answers to questions on how well managed 
the program under consideration is; it does not attempt to ask whether the program is 
itself an appropriate strategy to achieve the desired outcomes. To address this 
question, Mauch and Birch (1989) recommend use of the summative evaluation 
approach, where the outcomes achieved by the program concerned are evaluated to 
determine whether the program is effective. Some evaluations will attempt to 
undertake both formative and summative approaches. 
Hamburger (1992), in discussing the ability of Australian Parliaments to conduct 
evaluations, noted that they were often considered as relatively ineffective. This was 
because of issues such as the strong party system in the Australian political system, 
the absence of incentives to give credit to good performance, and the ad-hoc nature of 
parliamentary based evaluations which are often initiated for political purposes and in 
the absence of a coherent review structure. He also noted that the members of 
Parliament themselves are often ill equipped to conduct evaluations, lacking skills, 
knowledge and experience of that function. Jaensch (cited in Gavin, 1994) notes that 
parliamentary committees may be less effective as policy review mechanisms when 
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the Government dominates the committee's chamber, when party political issues 
dominate committee deliberations or when Governments can ignore or reject 
committee recommendations without significant cost. Godfrey ( cited in Hynd, 1996) 
is critical of many Parliamentary committee reports. In his view, this is because they 
mix policy with administrative detail, emphasise process over outcome, fail to 
endorse effective work by the public sector and cause public servants to concentrate 
on defending their actions in place of seeking service improvement. 
On the other hand, many writers take a positive view of the role parliamentary 
committees in general, and Senate committees in particular, have in reviewing the 
work of Government (see for example: Marsh, 1995; Uhr, 1997; Gavin, 1994; Young, 
1997; Sibraa, 1991; Galligan, 1991 and Mulgan, 1996). Official statements in the 
Parliamentary Briefing paper on the operation of Senate committees are clear: 'The 
Senate's comprehensive committee system .... allows the Senate more effectively to 
perform its role as a house of review and in keeping the Government more 
accountable for its actions.' (Parliament of Australia, 1998, p 9). 
The Senate receives particular attention because of its frequent ability to be able to act 
independently of the government of the day. The Senate may be viewed as having 
two principle roles - that of the 'States' house where the interests of the states are 
represented, and that of being the house of review of government operations. Turner 
(1993) and Mulgan (1996) discuss the first role, noting that in practice the Senate's 
effectiveness as the champion of the states has been very limited. The discipline of 
the party system has usually prevented individual senators from going against the 
party line when a policy detrimental to their state comes to the vote. 
Uhr (1997), Mulgan (1996) and Marsh (1995) note that the ability of the Senate to 
undertake the second role of reviewing government policy has waxed and waned 
dependent on the capability of the government of the day to dominate it. Where the 
government of the day held a majority in the Senate, the Senate has usually been 
relatively ineffective in reviewing government operations - party discipline ensures 
that government senators support the government's position. Marsh (1995) noted that 
the period between 1901 and 1909 was characterised by Senate independence and 
conflict with the government of the day. The ability of strong parties after 1909 able 
to command majorities in the Senate when in government, reduced the Senate's 
effectiveness as a house of review. This condition persisted until the rise of the 
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minority parties, in particular the Australian Democrats, following the defeat of the 
Fraser Government in 1983 (Marsh, 1995). Subsequent governments have been 
unable to achieve control of the Senate, being forced to negotiate support on specific 
issues with the minor parties (Marsh, 1995; Mulgan, 1996; Uhr, 1997). This has 
enabled Senate committees to become effective mechanisms for the review of 
government operations (Marsh, 1995; Uhr, 1997). 
The ability of the Senate to oppose the will of the government of the day has resulted 
in occasional outbursts of venom by frustrated Prime Ministers - Paul Keating's 
infamous gibe that the members of the Senate were 'unrepresentative swill' being one 
of the better known comments. More recently, in 1999, senior members of the 
Howard government proposed changing the Senate's electoral system to remove its 
ability to block government sponsored legislation (Lees, 1999). Such charges and 
proposals for change are likely to continue for as long as governments of the day are 
unable to dominate the Senate. 
Coupled with the recent increased relevance of the Senate and its committees as 
review mechanisms has been increased academic interest in examining the workings 
and effectiveness of the committees. Although Hynd (1996) and Young (1997) both 
comment on the comparative absence of studies of committees, their work forms part 
of a growing corpus of knowledge on the subject. Sibraa (1991), Hayden (1991) and 
Galligan (1991) argue favourably on the ability of Senate committees to contribute 
effectively to good governance. Lucy (1993), cited in Gavin (1994, p 71), saw that 
'parliamentary committees are the most important sources of information . . . . A 
strong committee system . . . makes life difficult for the executive.' Jaensch (1992), 
also cited in Gavin (1994), was less favourable, identifying limitations in the 
effectiveness of committees because of their inability to coerce the executive and the 
influence of party politics because members were normally more aligned to their 
party than the committee or its subject. Gavin (1994) noted that the committee system 
in the ACT Legislature was more effective than the Federal Parliament's system 
because the ACT Legislature was obliged to heed committee findings and 
recommendations, whereas the Federal Parliament was not. 
Marsh (1995) foresees an increasingly important role for Senate committees in the 
future based on his argument that governments of the day are unlikely to be able to 
dominate the Senate. He argues that the minor parties and independents in the Senate 
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will, through the committee system, be able to force a more inclusive and accessible 
approach to the development of public policy, removing it from the preserve of the 
major parties. 
Hynd ( 1 996) examined whether Senate committee focused more on matters of 
process or on matters of policy, tentatively concluding that there was a tendency to 
towards a process orientation, but that each committee and indeed report was 
different and that the committees themselves varied across time and issues. Mulgan 
( 1 996), in his extensive discussion of the Senate, viewed favourably the ability of the 
Senate and its committees to hold the government of the day accountable for policy 
decisions. 
Gavin ( 1994, p 72) evaluated the effectiveness of the committee system in the 
Australian Capital Territory's Legislative Assembly. Building from a range of 
sources, including other writers and political parties, she developed a set of five 
criteria that can be used to evaluate committee performance. These include the scope 
and significance of inquiry topics, the conduct of the inquiries, the findings and 
whether party affiliations influenced them, the impact of the inquiry, and whether the 
committee system tended to supplant the legislative chamber. 
In light of recent conflicting assessments of the significance of the Senate in 
reviewing government policy, the purpose of this study is to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the Senate Committee's inquiry into Australia's emergency 
management arrangements. The evaluation is a case study of a specific inquiry by a 
Senate committee. Within the growing literature covering the performance of Senate 
and other parliamentary committees there is relatively little attention given to specific 
inquiries or indeed to the work of specific committees. This study provides an insight 
into how a Senate committee inquires into an issue and its ability to produce 
outcomes of value to the Australian community. 
The research for this study was conducted within a multi-faceted theoretical 
framework that includes theories on societal response to disaster, the role of 
government in disaster and theories on the role of the Senate as a house of review in 
the Australian political system. 
The research strategy was founded on a content analysis of the Childs Report, 
supported by a content analysis of the transcripts of the public hearings held by the 
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Senate committee during the course of the inquiry in Melbourne, Adelaide, Darwin, 
Port Hedland, Sydney, Canberra, Wudinna and Perth. The purpose of the content 
analysis was to tease out the evidence needed to allow evaluation of the Committee's 
inquiry. Consideration was given to approaching participants in the preparation of the 
Childs Report to provide qualitative data on the effectiveness of the processes used by 
the Senate Committee to prepare the report. Given the passage of time since 1994, 
this research alternative was not pursued. Participants may be impossible to locate, 
may not be willing to assist and their memories may have dimmed. One, at least, is 
deceased (Senator Panizza). 
The second chapter of the study provides an account of Australia's arrangements for 
managing disasters and emergencies. This is important because Australian emergency 
management is a complex policy area characterised by significant technical aspects. 
Expertise in the area is not widespread and is limited to specialists within a small 
range of government agencies plus a small number of academic researchers. This 
chapter provides an understanding of the subject and the issues affecting to assist 
comprehension of the evaluation of the Senate Committee's inquiry. 
The third chapter discusses the conduct and findings of the Senate inquiry itself. The 
discussion includes consideration of the Government's response to the inquiry and 
examines the degree to which the Government accepted the inquiry's findings. 
The fourth chapter assesses the Senate inquiry to enable an evaluation to be made of 
whether it was an appropriate and effective method of reviewing and making 
recommendations on Australia's emergency management arrangements. Issues 
considered include whether the Senate Committee adequately considered the impact 
of economic rationalism, its use of recognised international expertise and 
benchmarks, depth and breadth of consultation and the low salience of emergency 
management in the community and to decision-makers generally. 
The concluding chapter completes the evaluation of the Senate Committee's inquiry 
into Australian emergency management arrangements. The evaluation indicates that 
the inquiry, overall, was not a success. The conduct of the inquiry was found to be 
deficient in a number of aspects, particularly the failure to consider or recommend a 
national statutory framework or to use independent expert knowledge, the failure to 
address important issues impacting on Australian emergency management and the 
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failure to adequately engage local government in the inquiry process. The tendency of 
the Senate Committee to focus on issues of the moment is also identified as a 
problem, because the focus on issues then in the media resulted in issues of equal or 
greater importance being ignored by the committee. The findings presented in the 
Childs Report are also found to be deficient, particularly in terms of the absence of 
any findings considering the Australian emergency management system as a whole. 
The impact of the inquiry is also found to be distinctly lacking - the Government 
response indicates rejection of most of the important findings and recommendations, 
although most of the lesser ones are accepted. 
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Chapter 2: Emergency Management in Australia 
A diverse and complex range of issues confronted members of the Senate Committee 
when they commenced their review of Australia's emergency management 
arrangements. Australia's system of emergency management has undergone 
considerable change over the decades since the Second World War and these changes 
coupled with the demands of federalism, economic rationalism and new 
managerialism made the field highly suitable for constructive review. 
This chapter discusses Australia's emergency management arrangements through 
examination of the development of the arrangements over time and review of the 
current situation. It examines the influence of Australia's constitutional arrangements 
and federalism, the influence of civil defence during and after the Second World War 
and developments that resulted in an increased focus on natural hazards in the 1970's. 
The major role of United States theorists in guiding Australian policy is examined 
together with a discussion of the role of government in managing emergencies. The 
historical aspect is important as it enables understanding of why the Commonwealth 
is involved in a function that is constitutionally the preserve of the states. 
Emergency management has been defined in Australia as: 
The range of measures to manage risks to communities and environment. It 
involves the development and maintenance of arrangements to prevent or 
mitigate, prepare for, respond to, and recover from emergencies and disasters 
in both peace and war.' (National Emergency Management Committee, 1996, 
p 1). 
This definition is holistic and envisages comprehensive activities that apply a systems 
approach to the management of emergencies and disasters. The definition 
incorporates efforts to prevent the hazard agent causing an adverse impact, as well as 
the more conventional amelioration of the direct and indirect effects of the hazard 
agent should prevention fail. It also recognises that should a disaster or emergency 
occur it is not enough to provide just an emergency response - the community must 
also be assisted to recover from the effects. Figure 1 shows the model proposed by the 
definition as a simple system. 
Figure 1 
PREVENTION H PREPAREDNESS H RESPONSE H RECOVERY 
, ... 
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The primary forces influencing the development of the arrangements have been 
Australia's Constitution and the consequential effects of federalism, international 
developments in the theory and practice of emergency management, the nature of the 
hazard agents that threaten Australia and the physical and human geography of 
Australia itself. More recently, as with most spheres of public sector activity, the 
forces of managerialism and/or economic rationalism are having an impact on the 
nation's emergency management capability. A final influence, and one that is often 
associated with economic rationalism, is the decline in voluntarism in Australia. 
Yates (1997), in a discussion of the impact of federalism on disaster mitigation in 
remote Aboriginal communities, noted that the Constitution granted specific powers 
to the Federal Government primarily in the fields of communications, defence, trade, 
foreign affairs and currency. The states are left with unspecified residual powers that 
are taken to include responsibility for most emergency management functions 
including health, land management, police and emergency services. Local 
government is established by state law and not by the Commonwealth Constitution. 
A literal interpretation of the Australian Constitution would not find much 
opportunity for Federal involvement in emergency management. In the years before 
the Second World War, disasters and emergencies were a local responsibility 
(Wettenhall, 1980). The Mayor, Police officer-in-charge and other sundry local 
officials would manage the response, seeking financial aid and some technical 
expertise from the State Government. The Federal Government's role was limited to 
restoring any of its own facilities that may have been damaged and providing 
additional financial aid to the State if required. 
The increasing tensions between the western democracies and the totalitarian regimes 
in Europe and concern over Japan's intentions in the late 1930's saw a rising 
Australian awareness of the risk of war. This led to the establishment of Australian 
civil defence organisations, modelled on the British system (Britton, 1986), 
consequent to a 1936 Commonwealth/State Ministerial meeting (Wettenhall, 1975; 
Department of Defence, 1992). The civil defence organisations, intended to respond 
to air raids, were a state responsibility (Britton, 1984), although the Department of 
Defence (1992) notes that the 1936 meeting marks the start of Commonwealth 
involvement in emergency management. After the War, the tensions of the Cold War 
prompted the Commonwealth to provide greater leadership through creation of a 
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Directorate of Civil Defence that encouraged the states to maintain their own civil 
defence capabilities through small professional public service bureaus (Britton, 
1 984). The role of the Commonwealth was to provide training, equipment and policy 
guidance to the States (Britton, 1984; Wettenhall, 1980; Department of Defence, 
1992). The States continued to provide the conventional police, fire and ambulance 
services. 
As time passed, the civil defence requirement waned but the need to keep responding 
to disasters and emergencies did not. By 1 975, the transformation from a civil 
defence stance to a natural disasters orientation was almost complete - the 
Commonwealth Civil Defence Directorate had become the Natural Disasters 
Organisation (remaining in the Defence Department) and the state based civil defence 
offices had become State ( or Territory) Emergency Services (Britton, 1984 ). 
Wettenhall ( 1 975) notes that the Australian experience closely parallels the US 
experience. 
The Childs Report (1994, p 2) noted: 
Despite the fact that disaster management is primarily a state or territory 
responsibility, the Commonwealth Government has assumed or been given 
responsibility in many areas. The Commonwealth has a very large role in 
preparedness, through coordinating mitigation activities, forecasting, 
monitoring, research, training, and information transfer. Then at the time of 
disaster, it plays an essential role in providing assistance to the states or 
territories through ... Emergency Management Australia. Finally, after the 
event, the Commonwealth can assist with relief and funding arrangements to 
compensate individuals and the state or territory for losses, as well as assisting 
with other recovery arrangements. 
Some minor changes at the Commonwealth level took place following the 1992 
review by the Department of Defence into the Natural Disasters Organisation (NDO). 
The review recommended that NDO be retitled Emergency Management Australia 
(EMU), that it be civilianised and relocated into the Department of Prime Minister 
and Cabinet (Department of Defence, 1 992). While the change of title did take place, 
for reasons unknown the relocation did not. Furthermore, although the staff positions 
in EMA are now civilianised, the Director General and a significant proportion of 
senior appointments are retired military officers. 
Having reviewed the origins of Australia's emergency management arrangements, it 
is appropriate to provide an overview of the arrangements as they now apply. It is 
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necessary to consider each level of government in turn, starting with the 
Commonwealth, then state government and finally local government. Each level must 
be considered separately because each has a different role. 
The Commonwealth does not have direct responsibility for emergency management, 
other than in directly administered territories. It nevertheless continues to provide 
leadership at the national level and retains a considerable capability to assist the 
states. As in 1994, there is no Commonwealth emergency management legislation, 
nor is there any evidence of any intent to enact such legislation. 
This is in stark contrast to the United States where national emergency management 
legislation has been in place since 1950 (Federal Emergency Management Agency 
[FEMA ], undated). The US legislation establishes a framework where emergency 
management is a partnership between the three levels of government. It clearly states 
that 'It is the policy and intent of Congress to provide a system of civil defence for 
the protection of life and property in the United States from attack and from natural 
disasters.' (FEMA, undated, p 1 ). State emergency management legislation must be 
consistent with the federal law, and state law in turn authorises local government's 
emergency management activity. Local government is seen as the primary service 
delivery arm, controlling the emergency services, with the state and federal 
governments providing financial, resource and technical support. Emergency 
management in the United States at least starts from a position of having a strong 
legislative base, even if it remains an issue of low salience to decision-makers (see 
Rossi, Wright and Weber-Burdin, 1982; Turner, Nigg and Heller Paz, 1986; 
Schneider, 1994). An indication of one of the differences can be found by comparing 
the annual budgets of FEMA, at $US3.2 billion, and EMA, at $Al l  million in 
1997/98 (FEMA, 1997; Department of Defence, 1998). EMA's budget is 0.21% of 
FEMA's, a tiny fraction of what is spent in the United States. 
As in 1994, Emergency Management Australia is the Commonwealth agency 
responsible for emergency management at the national level. It remains a part of the 
Department of Defence, notwithstanding at least two recommendations to remove it -
in 1992 following a review by Defence and in the subsequent Childs Report in 1994. 
EMA's main roles are developing national emergency management arrangements, 
providing national emergency management education and training, coordinating 
Commonwealth support to the states and territories during disasters and maintaining a 
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basic civil defence capability (EMA, 1 998a). The Commonwealth also has substantial 
physical and financial assets available to assist the states respond to emergencies, 
although they are only generally available when state assets are either expended or 
lack the required capacity (EMA, 1 998b ). 
The states4 are the primary providers of emergency management in Australia. As 
previously discussed the Australian Constitution gives the responsibility for the 
protection of life and property to the states as a residual power. It also gives the states 
the ability to create local government in whatever form the state concerned desires, 
again as a residual power as local government is not considered in the Constitution 
(Painter, 1 993). Consequently, the states are directly responsible for most of each of 
the four phases of emergency management (as shown in Figure 1 above). Land 
management, for example, is a key element in preventing hazards impacting on 
communities - flood can be virtually eliminated as an emergency if buildings, roads 
and other assets are kept out of flood plains. Land management is normally the 
preserve of the states, although recent High Court decisions have introduced 
limitations (Nelson, 1 993). The expansion of the Commonwealth's external affairs 
power to control land use in certain heritage listed areas ( eg. the Franklin River in 
Tasmania) or the Mabo native land rights decision are examples of the new limits. 
With respect to the preparedness and response phases, the states provide the police, 
fire, ambulance and state emergency services, although it should be noted that in 
some states such as Western Australia, local government may be authorised by the 
state to establish a rural fire service (McKay, 1996). Hospital and medical services 
are similarly the preserve of the states. The recovery phase is also dominated by the 
states through their provision of the community welfare departments, although the 
non-government sector's philanthropic agencies like the Salvation Army have an 
important role. While there are many similarities, each state's emergency 
management arrangements are unique: the powers available to authorities varies, 
responsibilities vary and the requirements placed on local government vary (McKay, 
1 996). At the legislative level, all states except Western Australia have legislation 
governing emergency management, albeit introduced at different times with 
4 For the purposes of this discussion, the 'states' is taken to also include the Northern Territory and the 
Australian Capital Territory since for emergency management purposes they function in the same 
fashion as the states. In the other territories, such as Christmas Island, the Commonwealth retains full 
responsibility for emergency management. 
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consequential differences in powers and coverage. Most states separate the police 
from the other emergency services; some states have a single fire service, while 
others may have separate rural and urban fire services. Ambulance services may be 
provided by a state agency or by a contractual arrangement with the private sector or 
a philanthropic organisation. 
The role of local government in emergency management in Australia is less well 
defined. Although seen as being a critical component of the nation's emergency 
management arrangements (Ingle-Smith, 1997), local government in Australia is far 
more limited in what it can do than is the case in the United States. Painter (1993, p 
194) notes that 'Most people probably associate local government with roads, kerbs 
and gutters and garbage collection; they are not too far off the mark'. He also notes 
that compared to Europe or the United States, Australian state governments provide 
many services that would be a local government responsibility. Australian local 
governments do have an important role in land management - in most states they 
have at least some delegated authority from the state to grant building approvals. 
They do not, however, provide the police or other emergency services ( except for 
some rural fire services), nor do they provide hospital, medical or the primary 
community welfare services. Most local governments do possess or have access to 
various types of plant and machinery, such as bulldozers, that can provide support 
during an emergency. Local governments in Australia are rarely able to innovate or 
take the initiative in implementing emergency management as the state governments 
usually reserve this privilege to themselves (Ingle-Smith, 1997). 
The role of local government in emergency management is one of implementing 
some aspects of state emergency management policy, particularly in respect to land 
management and providing a range of supporting services during the event. They 
also, by virtue of their land management role, have an important part to play in 
managing community recovery after the impact of a hazard. By way of comparison, 
in the United States, local governments provide many of the key services involved in 
emergency management, including the police and fire services. This does lead to a 
potentially complicating factor absent in Australia - the sheer number and 
proliferation of services. A report issued by FEMA (1998) noted that there were over 
32 000 separate fire services in the US. This compares to an Australian total of 
approximately a dozen fire services. 
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Australian emergency management fits well with a theory discussed by Painter (1988; 
1998), who argued that Australian federalism was characterised by cooperative 
arrangements between the state and commonwealth governments. Australian 
cooperative federalism, as discussed by Painter (1988; 1998), stems from the division 
of powers in the Constitution. Although the framers of the Constitution intended to 
limit the Commonwealth to a specific set of powers, in practice however, neither the 
states nor the commonwealth have complete and exclusive jurisdiction in any policy 
arena. As we have seen, Australia's emergency management arrangements had their 
origin in the civil defence programs established by the states to counter a defence 
situation (defence being an area of Commonwealth jurisdiction). As civil defence 
transformed into emergency management arrangements coping with natural and man­
made hazards (an area of state responsibility), the Commonwealth continued to play 
an important role, thus supporting a cooperative approach to the subject. 
International developments in the theory and practice of emergency management 
have strongly influenced Australian emergency management. Although some 
research into disasters and emergencies took place as early as 191 7  and in an ad-hoc 
fashion in the 1920s and 1930s (Wettenhall, 1975, Britton, 1989a), the field did not 
develop into a recognised research discipline until the cold war period following 
World War II provided a vital catalyst. Defence officials in the United States were 
concerned over the effects nuclear attack would have on civilian communities and 
considered that studies of the impact of natural hazards could provide useful 
information (Wettenhall, 1980). Although nuclear war did not occur between the 
Soviet Union and the West, it was found that the information being gained through 
the study of disasters was useful in its own right. This was because disasters kept 
occurring and there was an expectation that government would act (Wettenhall, 1980; 
Rossi, Wright and Weber-Burdin, 1982; Turner, Nigg and Heller Paz, 1986; 
Schneider, 1995). 
The outcome of the impetus provided by the military's need for knowledge was the 
development of disaster research as a mature and recognised field of study with a rich 
body of research into the effects of disasters on communities, albeit primarily in the 
United States (Wettenhall, 1975). This body of knowledge has provided much of the 
theoretical basis for understanding how communities, organisations and individuals 
respond to the effects of disasters and how hazard agents are best managed. 
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Australian researchers such as Wettenhall and Britton have applied the concepts to 
studies of Australian disasters and elements of the work of United States researchers 
such as Quarantelli, Dynes and Foster can be found in manuals and other publications 
released by Emergency Management Australia. 
Quarantelli ( 1 987, p 1 - 13 ;  1 997, p 4 1 )  summarised the state of knowledge in the late 
1980's on how best to manage disasters and emergencies. Based on the findings of 
research into social and behavioural response, he recommended ten criteria for good 
planning that are well accepted as standards to measure the effectiveness of 
emergency management. The criteria were: 
1 .  Recognition that disasters are different to  emergencies, 
2. Planning should cover all hazards and not be agent specific, 
3. Planning should be integrated not fragmented, 
4. Planning should be coordination orientated not command/control 
oriented, 
5. General principles are more important than specific details, 
6. Process is more important than the final document, 
7. Anticipation is better than reaction, 
8. Realistic responses should be used, not ideal state, 
9. Planning should be knowledge based, and 
10. Scientific knowledge should be used. 
In addition to these criteria, disaster researchers identified a number of other 
important principles that apply to emergency management generally. Although 
military command and control models are often applied in the civil emergency 
management environment, significant research indicates they are not appropriate. 
Dynes ( 1994) brought these arguments together in an important work that challenged 
the military command and control paradigm. He argued that civil society is 
characterised by loose structures and partnerships that overlap each other and the 
military models could not adequately cope with the need for cooperation and 
interaction essential for effective functioning in civil society. Dynes' ( 1 994) model 
presents six principles for emergency management. Firstly, confusion is normal 
during disasters, but this is not chaos and should not be seen as abnormal and 
something to be controlled. Secondly, people will cope with the event and will 
continue do their jobs or react appropriately to the situation. Thirdly, the normal 
social structure is the most appropriate one to manage response and recovery 
activities. Fourthly, planning should assume that people would make rational 
decisions. Fifthly, plans need to value decentralised decision-making. Finally, the aim 
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of planning should be to solve problems using open systems that enable flexibility 
and initiative. 
The salience of emergency management to political decision-makers has also been 
extensively researched in the United States. General agreement exists that, other than 
during a disaster and the immediate post-impact period, emergency management is a 
low priority issue with decision-makers. Rossi, Wright and Weber-Burdin (1982) 
reported that neither the public nor decision-makers ranked it highly, while Petak 
(1985) commented that most public administrators reacted to events as they occurred 
rather than practise pre-impact mitigation. Turner, Nigg and Heller Paz (1986) 
reported that while survey respondents expected governments to manage natural 
hazards, other issues were ranked as more important. Tierney (1989) postulated that 
one reason for the low salience was the absence of interest groups pushing these 
issues onto the policy agenda, other than during the immediate aftermath of a disaster. 
Schneider (1995) noted that market failure is a feature of emergency management. 
Generally people are unwilling to pay pre-impact to prevent a hazard because of low 
perceived risk, but may be unable to pay post-impact because the directly impacted 
population may not be large enough to fully fund restorative action. 
The sociology of disasters has also provided an important field of research, 
particularly studies of the way organisations and individuals respond. In 1970, Dynes 
published his influential book "Organised Behavior in Disaster", a pioneering work 
that provided a typology and theoretical foundation for disaster sociology (Britton, 
1989a). It argued that because of the community disruption caused by disasters and 
the critical place of organisations in society, it was vital to understand how 
organisations reacted to community disruption. Dynes' work postulated a typology of 
four classes of organisations (established, expanding, extending and emergent) that 
has been widely applied (Britton, 1989b ). Wettenhall (1975), for example, applied the 
typology in his discussion of the organised response to the 1967 Tasmanian bushfires. 
Research into individual behaviour during disasters has also provided critical 
information for emergency managers. Perry, Lindell and Greene (1981 ), for example, 
investigated how emergency managers can most effectively communicate with people 
in communities at risk from hazardt They point out the importance of consistent 
messages from official sources and emphasise that people will seek confirmation 
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from their own experience and from neighbours, friends and relatives, often placing 
greater reliance on unofficial sources. 
Australia's emergency management arrangements are also contingent to an extent on 
the nature of the hazards, particularly natural hazards, which threaten Australia. 
Australia is prone to a wide range of natural and man-made hazards. Tropical 
cyclones threaten the northern half of the continent each year between November and 
April with the scale of the threat varying with the El Nino phase of the Southern 
Oscillation (Oliver, 1986). During the winter months, severe storms and gales can 
affect the southern half of the continent. Floods, often in the aftermath of tropical 
cyclones or storms, can affect huge tracts of land for weeks or months at a time. Flash 
floods can strike with little warning and can be devastating in highly populated urban 
areas (Chapman, 1994). Bushfires cause more fatalities than other natural hazards, 
even if the annual economic loss is lower than other hazards and they can affect any 
part of Australia when conditions are right (Oliver, 1986; Childs Report, 1994). 
Earthquake is a significant hazard for much of Australia, albeit one that is much less 
well appreciated by the community than the more frequent and visually obvious 
bushfire and meteorological hazards. Earthquakes strike without warning and because 
of the very short period for which historical records are available, they may occur in 
areas previously thought to be at low risk. Oliver (1986), for example, includes a risk 
map that indicated most of the Northern Territory to be earthquake free. By 1988, this 
map has substantially changed because a large earthquake near Tennant Creek in 
January 1988 brought to light a 'new' risk area in the Territory (Denham & Michael­
Leiba, 1989). Offshore earthquakes can also cause tsunamis, although only relatively 
small parts of the Australian coast are at risk. Landslips have caused loss of life and 
property losses - the tragedy at Gracetown in Western Australia in 1996 and the 
substantial property loss near Wollongong in 1998 are examples. 
Australia faces the normal complement of man-made hazards, most stemming from 
some form of technological or human failure. Aircraft can crash, buses, trucks and 
cars collide, dams can fail, industrial accidents take place and hazardous materials can 
be released as a result of any of the above. Disasters can occur from the failure of 
critical lifelines as the power supply problems suffered in Auckland, New Zealand 
during 1998 showed. Fire in man-made structures remains a constant threat to life and 
property. 
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Communities will be more or less vulnerable to these hazards dependent on factors 
including proximity to the location and magnitude of the hazard, socio-economic 
status, pre & post-impact mitigation activities and past experience with the hazard. 
Economically disadvantaged communities tend to be more vulnerable to floods 
(Britton, 1987) and industrial hazards (Britton & Lindsay, 1995) because 'at-risk' 
land is normally less expensive. Yates (1997) noted that Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander communities in remote areas are particularly vulnerable to hazards because 
of their generally poor socio-economic status and the ability of governments within 
the federal system to evade responsibility for the problems facing the communities. 
To cope with these natural and man-made hazards, the Australian states have 
established the conventional range of police, fire and other emergency services that 
can be found in any developed nation. Unlike many developed nations, however, 
Australia places great reliance on volunteer participation in the emergency services. 
The terms of reference for the inquiry by the Senate Committee emphasised the 
importance of volunteers by specially requiring the Committee to 'fully respecting 
and utilising the skills and capabilities of volunteer organisations' (Childs Report, 
1 994, p iv). It has not been possible to obtain an estimate of the number of volunteers 
in the Australian emergency services overall. Research into emergency service 
volunteers found that there were over 2.6 million persons providing voluntary work in 
Australia in 1995 (Australian Bureau of Statistics cited in Reinholdt & Smith, 1998, p 
5). In Western Australia, figures are available on the number of emergency service 
volunteers. The WA State Emergency Service (1997) reported 2 300 volunteers and 
42 permanent staff, the Fire and Rescue Service (1997) reported 2 317 volunteers 
verses 972 career staff and the Bush Fires Board (1997) estimated 16 000 volunteers 
and 45 career staff. Volunteers thus often outnumber career emergency services 
personnel and can be found in almost any Australian community, no matter how 
remote or isolated. Volunteers can participate alongside career personnel - most 
Australian fire services have both career and volunteer firefighters. Some 
organisations are almost entirely volunteer based, with only a small career staff cadre 
to provide some training and management functions - the State Emergency Services 
being an example. Volunteers are also found in many of the philanthropic services 
that support communities, particularly during the recovery phase. The Salvation 
Army and Red Cross are just two of many examples. Britton (1986) used the term 
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Disaster-Relevant Organisation Network (DRON) to describe the full range 
organisations - public sector, private sector and philanthropic - that participate in 
emergency management. Volunteers can be found in many DRON organisations and 
without them, the total cost of emergency management would be much greater. 
As in the United States, Australian DRON organisations have tended to focus on 
preparing for and responding to emergencies rather than attempting to prevent their 
occurrence altogether. Foster (1980), a Canadian, made a major contribution with his 
book 'Disaster Planning' to addressing this problem. His comprehensive study 
discussed managing hazards to prevent disasters and placed great emphasis on 
thorough investigation and assessment of risk through geographical information 
systems and rational ranking of hazards. His work was very influential, not only in 
the United States, but also in Australia. Examples of it can be found in emergency 
management planning guides issued by Emergency Management Australia. The 
Childs Report (1994) noted, however, that the response phase continued to be 
emphasised by emergency managers and more attention needed to be paid to all 
aspects of hazard mitigation, including prevention. 
Emergency management has not been immune from the sweeping changes affecting 
the public sector because of the global phenomenon of economic 
rationalism/managerialism. Within the rich literature on the subject, there is 
considerable debate on what to call this phenomenon (Alford, 1997). Hood and 
Jackson (1991) refer to new public management while Erny (1993, p 16) refers to 
'economic rationalism'. Painter (1997, p 151) uses 'economic liberalism' and 
Considine and Painter (1997, p 4) differentiate between economic rationalism and 
'managerialism/new public management'. 
Considine and Painter's (1997) differentiation of new public management and 
economic rationalism appears to be most useful when considering the impact of the 
new paradigm on emergency management. New public management describes a 
fundamental change away from the classical Weberian rational/legal bureaucracy 
towards a notionally more efficient model for government where outcomes are more 
important than processes (Hood and Jackson, 1991 ). Economic rationalism refers to 
the imposition of market concepts onto government activities through the introduction 
of competition, outsourcing, the purchaser-provider model and wide spread 
corporatisation and privatisation of many government services (Painter, 1997). Both 
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new public management and economic rationalism have become dominant themes in 
government. In Australia, for example, there is effective bipartisan support for the 
new paradigm at federal and state levels that ensures its implementation (Painter 
1997). 
Alford (1997) discusses some of the ways the new paradigm can have a positive 
impact on the emergency services. Fire services that have traditionally focussed on 
response measures such as fire fighting have begun to investigate actions to suppress 
fires by preventing their occurrence. This results in firefighters undertaking more 
education activities and less fire fighting. The intended outcome is fewer fires and 
hence reduced fire losses. 
Many writers, however, do not share this positive view of the impact of economic 
rationalism. Davis (1997, p 210) describes concerns over the loss of impartial advice 
to governments, reductions in the ability of governments to 'nation-build' and the 
tendency for government to become a series of unrelated contracting units lacking 
cohesion and depth. Similarly, Wettenhall (1997) notes that government must 
consider and act for the whole nation, not segments of it. This, he believes, is 
fundamentally in conflict with market driven solutions that may exclude sections of 
society. Both of the issues raised by Davis and Wettenhall could tend to reduce the 
ability of government to undertake emergency management. 
Hood and Jackson (1991) take the view that one of the adverse consequences of new 
public management is increased vulnerability to emergencies and disasters. This is 
because it emphasises efficiency in place of technical quality, fragments the public 
sector, imposes significant funding reductions, promotes output in place of process, 
generates poll driven policies and has minimal regulation. In aggregation, Hood and 
Jackson (1991) believe that these increase the probability of a disaster and reduce the 
ability of government to respond. Gabriel (1998) notes that the new paradigm may 
increase risk due to uncertainty on how well newly privatised utilities will cope with 
the demands of emergencies and disasters. A similar argument exists on the ability of 
local governments and other government agencies that have contracted out their 
workforce, plant and machinery to meet the increased demand for services that often 
occurs during disaster. Anecdotal evidence indicates that this is already becoming a 
problem as surplus capacity is not immediately available. Quarantelli (1997) also 
notes the potential for conflict between the public and private sectors because the 
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private sector is less able to act in the community's interest as opposed to a narrow 
sectional interest. 
Economic rationalism is also impacting adversely on the willingness and ability of 
people to volunteer for the emergency services according to a study by Reinholdt & 
Smith ( 1998). They note two adverse consequences stemming from economic 
rationalism. Firstly, it has exacerbated the population decline in rural areas as the 
public and private sectors close offices and facilities leading to fewer people in the 
appropriate age/skills cohorts suitable as volunteer emergency services personnel. 
Secondly, the increased working-hour demands placed on workers in many industries 
have reduced their availability to undertake volunteer activities. 
Kouzmin, Jarman & Rosenthal (1995) wrote critically on the state of Australia's 
emergency management arrangements. They noted that: 
Crisis and disaster management, for example, is clearly one inter-disciplinary 
and inter-agency policy arena of "wickedness" needing a considerable 
breakthrough in governmental policy and planning capacity. (p 21  ). 
They called into question Australian mitigation arrangements for earthquakes, for 
example, noting that earthquake risk zones and building standards appeared to be 
inadequate in the light of new information on the magnitude of the hazard. They also 
noted high levels of fragmentation in policy development and significant but 
suppressed conflict between the emergency services. Australia also compared poorly 
to North America and Europe in terms of tax relief given to disaster affected 
businesses. Kouzmin, et al, (1995, p 23) argued that this tax relief greatly improved 
business recovery post-disaster but was a strategy ignored in Australia. They also 
argued that all of this information had been available for many years -many of their 
references were dated before 1990. They recommended radical change to Australia's 
emergency management arrangements, including inter alia greater involvement by 
the military, establishing high-level policy bodies, improved citizen engagement and 
establishing a national policy college. 
Cobb (1998) investigated the vulnerability of Australia to disruption to modem 
information technology. His study for the Australian Parliament examined the threat 
posed to Australia from disruption to the nation's information technology 
infrastructure. Noting the complex and interdependent nature of Australia's 
information technology infrastructure, he concluded that immediate Government 
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action was essential to protect it from attack or damage however caused. He gives the 
extended power failure in Auckland in early 1998 as an example of what can occur. 
In particular, he points out that management strategies cannot be sectionalised or 
isolated within one part of government. Cooperative action across society is vital. 
In summary, Australia's Constitution dictates that emergency management is the 
preserve of the states and, consequently, the states remain the primary deliverers of 
emergency management to the community. The states provide most of the 
organisations involved in the DRON and are also responsible for establishing local 
government, the third tier of government involved in emergency management. Local 
government's emergency management role is quite circumscribed when compared to 
Europe and the United States, being limited to land management activities that may 
prevent disasters and providing resource and other support during emergencies. Local 
government also normally has a leading role in helping a community recover from the 
impact of an emergency or disaster. The Commonwealth, while constitutionally 
limited in its role, in fact provides considerable leadership to the states and possesses 
substantial resources that can assist the states during large-scale events where state 
resources are insufficient. Unlike the United States, however, there is no national 
legislation setting a formal goal to be achieved and putting in place a national 
framework. Developments in the theory and practice of emergency management, 
largely from the United States, have been highly influential in the evolution of 
Australian emergency management, providing a theoretical basis for the work of 
Australian emergency managers. More recently, economic rationalism has been 
impacting, in both beneficial and adverse ways on the ability of the public sector to 
provide emergency management services to the community. 
It must also be recognised that Australia has, to date, been comparatively free from 
major disasters. Australia has been spared the impact of a devastating earthquake on a 
capital city causing hundreds of deaths and thousands of injuries, for example. Our 
experience is limited to events that, although calamitous to the community concerned, 
have not over-stretched national or, with the exception of Darwin in 1974 after 
Cyclone Tracey's impact, state capabilities. Even events such as the Ash Wednesday 
wildfires of 1983 did not threaten the continued ability of government and 
philanthropic organisations and the community generally to function. The potential 
for devastating disasters to occur in Australia does exist - some of our capital cities 
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are at risk from natural and man-made hazards that could cause great loss of life, 
many injuries and severe damage to private and public assets. Although the nation's 
emergency management arrangements cope effectively with the many day-to-day 
emergencies and the rather less frequent larger scale events, the ability of the 
arrangements to cope with a major disaster remains untested and, as will be discussed 
in the next chapter, infrequently evaluated. 
This then was the policy environment of critical issues facing the Senate inquiry 
when it began its deliberations into emergency management in Australia. 
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Chapter 3 :  The Senate Inquiry - Conduct & 
Findings 
The ability of Senate and other parliamentary committees to undertake effective 
reviews of public policy and executive government has been subject to considerable 
debate in Australia. Proponents argue that they can be an effective means of holding 
the executive accountable for its actions and policies and provide a mechanism for a 
public debate over the merits or otherwise of an issue or policy. Detractors argue that 
they are often dominated by partisan politics, lack technical skills or knowledge of the 
issues being considered and are unable to gain acceptance by the executive of the 
results of their work. The purpose of this chapter is to review the conduct of the 
Senate Committee's inquiry into Australian emergency management and to analyse 
the recommendations presented to the government for action by the Committee. 
Parliamentary committees in the Australian Federal Parliament are unable to initiate 
inquiries into issues without first receiving formal approval by the House to which the 
committee belongs (Parliament of Australia, 1998). This requires that a majority of 
members of the House support the inquiry's motion. Because Governments of the day 
normally dominate the House of Representatives, inquiries by Representatives 
Committees are limited to issues that the Government wishes to be investigated. This 
has acted to limit the effectiveness of Representatives committees (Marsh, 1995). 
Senate committees, however, may be able to investigate issues contentious in the 
Government's eyes, as it is no longer normally able to dominate the Senate. This 
enables Senate committees, in theory, to be able to critically scrutinise and evaluate 
the operations of government (Marsh, 1 995). 
At the time of the Senate Committee's inquiry into emergency management, the ALP 
held Government with a majority in the House of Representatives, but did not have a 
majority in the Senate. The Senate then comprised 30 ALP members, 36 
Liberal/National Party coalition members with the minor parties and an independent 
(the ubiquitous Senator Brian Harradine) providing the balance. The Australian 
Democrats were the most numerous of the minor parties with 7 members, and the 
Greens had two members. Consequently, the minor parties and independent, by siding 
with either of the major parties, had the ability to control the outcome of Senate votes 
on legislation or other matters. 
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On 15  October 1 992, Senator Foreman (ALP - and the party then in Government) put 
the following motion that was passed without further debate or comment to the 
Senate: 
That the following matter be referred to the Standing Committee on Transport, 
Communications and Infrastructure for inquiry and report on or before the last 
day of sitting in February 1 994: 
The capacity of public sector authorities to plan for, forecast 
and respond to major disasters and large scale emergencies, 
fully respecting and utilising the skills and capabilities of 
volunteer organisations. (Foreman, p 1882). 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine and discuss the composition of the Senate 
Committee, the conduct of the inquiry, including the methodology used, and to 
analyse the findings presented in the Committee's report. 
In May 1 993, the Standing Committee on Transport, Communications and 
Infrastructure was combined with the Standing Committee on Industry, Science and 
Technology to form a single committee. The new Standing Committee on Industry, 
Science, Technology, Transport, Communications and Infrastructure, to give it its full 
name, agreed to continue with the 1 5  October 1 992 terms of reference (Senate 
Hansard, 29 Jun 94, p 2210). 
The composition of the new Committee was: Senator B. K. Childs (ALP - NSW), 
Chair; Senator B. R. Burns (ALP - Qld); Senator J. R. Devereux (ALP - Tas); Senator 
S. Murphy (ALP - Tas); Senator G. Chapman (LP - SA); Senator I. D. Macdonald 
(LP - Qld); Senator J. H. Panizza (LP - WA); and Senator J. R. Coulter (AD - SA). 
In addition to the parliamentary members, a Secretary, four researchers and two 
executive assistants supported the Committee. 
Of the eight Senators, four were members of the ALP, three were Liberals and one 
was from the Australian Democrats. No National Party members were on the 
Committee. No one party dominated the Committee - although the ALP had four out 
of eight members, it provided the Committee's Chair, thus giving the ALP and the 
Liberals equity of members, together with a single Australian Democrat left holding 
the 'balance', as far as that applies in Senate Committee work. 
The Committee, in both its variants, conducted its inquiry into Australian emergency 
management over a period of nearly two years. The inquiry was authorised on 
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15 October 1992 and the report, Disaster Management (the Childs Report), was tabled 
in the Senate on 29 June 1994. 
The Committee's report does not provide a specific description of the methodology 
used to conduct the inquiry. It is possible, however, to make some observations about 
the methodology used from information in the report and other sources. The 
Committee called for written submissions through an advertisement in a national 
newspaper, evidence was taken at public hearings in various locations across 
Australia, and briefings and inspections were likewise conducted across Australia. 
Written submissions were received from 85 individuals or organisations. Table 1, 
below, gives a break down of the submissions based on whether they were from an 
emergency service organisation, another public sector organisation, the Health sector, 
local government, non-government organisations or individuals. 
Table 1 
Emergency Other Public Health Local Non Private 
Services Sector Sector Government Government Individuals 
Organisations 
17 26 6 4 21 21 
Source: Derived from the Childs Report (1994, 121 - 125) 
The relatively low number of submissions from the emergency service organisations 
is significant. Counting just the police, fire, ambulance and state emergency services 
established in Australia, there are at least 32 official state or territory emergency 
service organisations that could have made a submission. Just over half chose to do 
so, per Table 1, although the 17 submissions from emergency service organisations 
are boosted by submissions from groups like the Australian Assembly of Fire 
Authorities and federal agencies like the Australian Maritime Safety Authority. If 
these are removed, then somewhat less than half of the 32 official state or territory 
emergency service organisations made a submission to the inquiry. This suggests that 
the inquiry did not achieve input from as many critical emergency service 
organisations as would have been desirable. 
The broader public sector, excluding emergency services, provided the largest cohort 
of submissions. This is to be expected as many public sector agencies are involved to 
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a greater or lesser extent in responding to emergencies and disasters. Submissions 
were received from federal and state public sector agencies. 
Six health authorities saw fit to make a submission. This is an indication that they, at 
least, were sufficiently interested in the inquiry to prepare and submit their opinion/s 
on the matter. 
Local government, however, was sadly under-represented in the number of 
submissions made to the inquiry. Of the hundreds of local governments in Australia, 
every one of which is involved in emergency management, only four made the effort 
to make a submission. They may have been blissfully unaware of the inquiry or were 
sufficiently disengaged from the process as to be unwilling to devote the time and 
effort to preparing a submission. 
Submissions from non-government organisations formed the equal second largest 
cohort. Organisations making submissions included a major airline, a radio station, 
salvage companies and no less than eight submissions from various branches of the 
South Australian Farmers Federation. Given the emphasis the Senate Committee gave 
to a mouse plague that affected South Australia during the course of the inquiry in its 
report, it is presumed that these submissions proved to be an effective means of 
raising an issue with the Committee. 
Finally, submissions from private individuals, the other equal second largest cohort, 
came from people across Australia. Notable amongst them were submissions from 
several authorities in the field, including Professor Wettenhall and Roger Jones, then 
Director of the Australian Emergency Management Institute. 
Public hearings were held on eleven occasions in three clusters. In July 1993, 
hearings were held in Melbourne, Adelaide, Darwin and Port Hedland. In October 
1993, hearings were held in Canberra (twice) and Wudinna in South Australia. 
Finally, in February and April 1994, hearings were held in Canberra, Sydney and 
Perth. 
From the List of Witnesses provided in the Childs Report (1994), it is evident that the 
emergency services and other public sector organisations dominated the public 
hearings. Table 2 below shows the break-up of witnesses by group. 
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Table 2 
Emergency Other Health Local Non Government Private 
Services Public Sector Government Organisations Individuals 
Sector 
16 17 1 1 3 4 
+ 13 SA 
farmers 
Source: Derived from the Childs Report (1994, 129 - 136) 
It appears that the emergency services gave almost equal weight to the need to both 
make written submissions and the need to appear at the public hearings, as virtually 
the same number made written submissions as appeared at the hearings. The other 
public sector agencies suffered a significant fall off in support between making the 
written submissions and appearing at the public hearings, with nearly one third fewer 
choosing to attend a public hearing. The Health sector showed a great fall off, 
dropping from six written submissions to one at a hearing. Local government 
continued to be very poorly represented at the public hearings, with only one, Port 
Hedland, choosing to attend. The number of non-government agencies also fell off 
dramatically, reducing from 21 written submissions to 3 appearances at hearings. The 
figures for private individuals are of interest. In raw terms, there was only a small 
drop off from 21 written submissions to 17 hearing appearances. When, however, the 
13 South Australian grain farmers are removed, the number of private hearing 
appearances falls off from 17 to 4 persons. As with the written submissions, the 
concurrent impact of the mouse plague in South Australia proved a major incentive 
for people to make appearances before the Committee. This lobbying appears to have 
been successful in so far as the Committee did make recommendations on the 
management of rodent plagues. 
The conduct of the Committee's public hearings limited wide consultation with the 
broader Australian community. No public hearings were held in Queensland, 
Tasmania or rural Victoria, New South Wales or the Northern Territory. This may 
have restricted the ability of citizens and local governments from making verbal 
submissions. Whilst this may not have been critical to the outcome, it does cast doubt 
on the quality of the consultative processes used. It also resulted in the omission of a 
significant portion of the population at risk from tropical cyclones and the hazards 
consequent to them. Although the Northern Territory and Western Australian 
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coastlines are cyclone risk areas, they are comparatively unpopulated compared to 
much of the Queensland coast. Queensland suffers a major proportion of Australia's 
flood and cyclone damage, due to a large extent to the relatively heavily populated 
coastline. In the Northern Territory and Western Australia, there is a reasonable 
chance that a cyclone crossing the coast will do so over a sparsely populated area, 
thus limiting the damage no matter how severe the cyclone is. In Queensland, 
however, the high growth rates and subsequent development of the coastline from 
Coolangatta north has resulted in population densities much greater than either the 
Northern Territory and Western Australia (Local Government Association of 
Queensland, 1998). The likelihood, therefore, of a cyclone affecting a populated area 
and causing damage is greater. It could be argued that for the Committee to gain a full 
appreciation of Australia's situation in respect of disasters, it should have consulted 
with communities in Queensland at risk from tropical cyclones. 
Similarly, Tasmania has a history of bushfires, with the devastating 1967 fires being 
one of long list. Written submissions from Tasmania were made, but Tasmanian 
organisations and individuals are absent from the witness list for the public hearings. 
Including Tasmania in the public hearing process would have improved the 
consultative processes even if the outcomes were not affected. 
Finally, the Committee did not hold hearings in any Aboriginal or Torres Strait 
Islander communities, particularly those in remote areas. Nor did any of the peak 
Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander representative groups or Government agencies 
dedicated to Aboriginal affairs make written submissions or appear at any of the 
public hearings. Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander communities are affected by 
disasters as much or more so than mainstream communities (Yates, 1997). Their 
generally poor socio-economic status limits their ability to fund adequate mitigation 
measures and they are often lost in a never-never land when seeking government 
support. Local government claims not to be responsible as they generally are not rate­
payers, while the state and Federal governments blame each other for successive 
policy failures (Yates, 1997). Consultation with the peak representative groups and 
with the communities themselves would have added considerably to the Committee's 
appreciation of the state of disaster management in Australia and may well have 
resulted in additional recommendations. 
31 
..... 
There is evidence, however, that inquiries into public policy issues can undertake too 
much public consultation. Uhr, cited in Hynd (1996), argues that because there may 
be too many competing views and positions on policy issues, inquiries that attempt 
too much consultation tend to fail to achieve consensus, resulting in dissenting 
reports. Given the low salience of emergency management to either the public or to 
policy-makers, Uhr's view may not be as valid for this issue as for other public policy 
inquiries. 
The Committee attended seven briefings on an aspect of disaster management. One 
was at the Australian Institute of Emergency Management in Victoria where it was 
presumably informed on the operation of the facility. It would appear that this might 
have, in part, prompted the Committee to recommend its retention. Two briefings 
were held in Newcastle, investigating the response and recovery following the 1989 
earthquake. Another briefing was in Canberra -while no details are listed, the Childs 
Report (1994) notes that the Committee was briefed on the function of Canberra 
based Emergency Management Australia. Sydney was the site of another briefing, but 
the purpose of this is unknown. The last two briefings were held in the Western 
Australian goldfields in an area affected by a major bushfire in the early part of the 
Committee's inquiry. The Childs Report (1994) gives this bushfire considerable 
consideration and a number of recommendations stem from it. As with the South 
Australian mouse plague, events happening concurrently with the Committee's 
inquiry appear to have been influential in the Committee's deliberations. 
The findings of the Inquiry were published in the report 'Disaster Management' 
tabled in the Senate on 29 June 1994 by the Senate Committee's chair, Senator Childs 
(1994). Senator Childs noted in his speech that the report was unanimous and had full 
support from all members. When describing the task set for the Committee's inquiry, 
he commented that it was to 'Consider the role the Commonwealth government plays 
in disaster management' (Childs, 1994, p 2210). This statement is not in complete 
agreement with the inquiry's Terms of Reference that charged the Committee to 
inquire into "The capacity of public sector agencies . . .  " without stipulating a 
limitation to the federal level. Nor, in fact, is the report limited solely to federal 
issues, making a number of recommendations that can only be implemented by state 
governments. 
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Senator Childs went on to state that the Committee believed that too much emphasis 
was being given to responding to emergencies and disasters. It recommended, 
therefore, that greater attention needed to be given to other mitigation activities, 
particularly those that prevent adverse events occurring (Childs, 1994, p 2211  ). Other 
findings by the Committee pointed out by Senator Childs included the need for 
improved state/federal cooperation, retention of the Commonwealth's training facility 
at Mt Macedon and removal of Emergency Management Australia from the Defence 
Department. 
Also speaking to the report was Senator Chapman, one of the Liberal Party's 
members on the Committee. Senator Chapman pointed out it was at his instigation 
that the inquiry considered the mouse plague problem in his home state, South 
Australia (Chapman, 1994b, p 2213). Senator Chapman spoke at some length on the 
mouse plague issue, and although extolling the bi-partisan nature of the report used 
the opportunity to attack the Government for its ineffective response to the plague. 
Senator Murphy, another of the ALP's members on the Committee spoke more 
briefly on the inquiry, noting 'Personally, it was a great experience to be able to travel 
around the country and look at some of the effects that have occurred.' (Murphy, 
1994, p 2214 ). He also expressed concern over the unwillingness of fire fighting 
authorities to adopt aerial fire bombing as a suppression technique. 
The Australian Democrats sole Committee member, Senator Coulter, reiterated 
Senator Murphy's concerns on aerial fire bombing, speaking at some length on the 
subject, including showing the Senate a model of a suitable aircraft (Coulter, 1994, p 
2215). 
The last speaker, Senator Panizza, a Liberal Committee member, stated in his speech 
that his primary interest during the inquiry was the bushfire hazard. His comments on 
the way the Committee considered the subject are worth noting: 'We looked at them 
right at the end of our inquiry. It might have even been New Years Day . . . when I 
rang Senator Childs and asked whether we could take that in at the end of the 
inquiry.' (Panizza, 1994, p 2216). Assuming he is referring to 1 January 1994, then 
the Committee does not appear to have given the bushfire hazard any significant 
attention until almost the last moment and after most of the public hearings have been 
completed (only three of the eleven were conducted after 1 January 1994). This, 
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however, is not entirely concordant with the witness list presented in the report. The 
list indicates a number of bushfire orientated witnesses, mostly rural fire services, as 
having appeared at public hearings well prior to 1 January 1994. What caused 
Senator's Panizza's sudden revelation will never be known due to his death in 1997. 
After Senator Panizza' s speech, there was no debate on the motion by Senator Childs 
that the Senate take note of the report and the motion was passed. The other 
Committee members, Senators Burns, Devereux and Macdonald, did not speak on the 
subject. 
The report tabled in the Senate on 29 June 1994 ran to an Executive Summary, 45 
recommendations, and 119 pages of text organised in eight chapters and eight 
appendixes. 
The Executive Summary provides an overview of the report and summarises its main 
conclusions. The coordinating role of Emergency Management Australia (EMA), the 
federal agency responsible for emergency management at the national level, is 
supported, but it is recommended that more attention be given to mitigation activities. 
The placement of EMA into the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet is 
strongly supported, as is retention of EMA's training institute at Mt Macedon. The 
United Nation's International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction is highlighted as 
a program that should receive greater attention. The need to improve post-disaster 
recovery arrangements is also highlighted. An improvement in coordination generally 
across federal agencies is called for. 
The Executive Summary includes forty-five recommendations aimed at improving 
Australian emergency management. As a general comment, the recommendations are 
pitched at a relatively low level and propose no substantial alterations to the current 
Australian arrangements for managing emergencies and disasters. This could either 
mean that Australia's arrangements are, largely, effective and appropriate, or that the 
inquiry by the Senate Committee failed to address the issue in a substantive manner 
and an opportunity for comprehensive reform has been missed. 
The recommendations have been assessed by dividing them into two groups: those 
recommendations that address matters of policy and those that address matters of 
administrative detail. Before considering this break-up, however, it is necessary to 
define what the terms 'policy' and 'administrative detail' mean. 
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Agreeing on what constitutes 'policy' has proven to be a thorny issue (see Wildavsky, 
1 979; Davis, Wanna, Warhurst & Weller, 1988). There is a range of definitions, 
mostly revolving around a decision-making process that leads to a course of action or 
scheme of implementation undertaken by government (or other agency). For the 
purpose of this analysis, a recommendation is defined as being 'policy' when it has a 
substantive impact on the general principles, processes, concepts and plans that 
govern Australia's arrangements to cope with disasters and emergencies. Inevitably, 
the assessment of whether a recommendation does make the grade as policy or policy 
related is subjective and not all will agree with the allocation made below. 
Matters of administrative detail are comparatively easier to define. They are those 
matters that are not policy and, hence, do not have a substantive impact on Australia's 
emergency management arrangements. 
Godfrey, cited in Hynd ( 1996), used the policy - administrative-detail dichotomy in a 
study of parliamentary oversight of public service activities. He points out that too 
great a concern with administrative detail may result in management being done by 
the parliamentary committees instead of by the managers. Godfrey calls for 
committees to focus on policy issues and community engagement. 
An example may assist to clarify the definitions. A recommendation that proposed 
new legislation governing Federal emergency management arrangements would be a 
policy level recommendation because if implemented will substantively impact on 
national arrangements that are currently not governed by a specific statute. On the 
other hand, a recommendation proposing that funding for a specific program be 
increased or decreased merely changes the emphasis within an established policy 
regime. Such a recommendation, although it might have a major impact on the 
program, does not represent a substantive policy change and would therefore be 
categorised as a 'administrative detail' type recommendation. 
The first and most important point revealed by the analysis of the recommendations is 
that none of them makes a statement regarding the overall direction of Australia's 
broad policy for the management of emergencies and disasters. Nowhere in the 
Executive Summary or the recommendations is there any assessment, comment or 
proposal that Australia's arrangements, overall, are good, bad or indifferent. There 
are statements contained within the body of the report that lead to the inference that 
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the Senate Committee was satisfied with the overall arrangements, but this is not 
specifically stated. It can be argued, on the basis of this, that the Committee does not 
appear to have considered macro-level issues of whether the system used by Australia 
is, in fact, the best that could be done in our system of government. 
Of the forty-five recommendations, eighteen were assessed as being relevant to policy 
issues, and the remaining twenty-seven were considered to be pertaining to details 
with the existing policy framework. 
A further analysis that can be undertaken is to compare the recommendations to the 
Committee's Terms of Reference for the inquiry. The Committee was charged with 
inquiring into 'The capacity of public sector authorities to plan for, forecast and 
respond to major disasters and large-scale emergencies, fully respecting and utilising 
the skills and capabilities of volunteer organisations' (emphasis added). Each 
recommendation can be assessed as to whether it contributes towards planning for, 
forecasting or responding to disasters or emergencies. Within this analysis, it is 
recognised that recommendations may apply to one, two or three of these categories. 
Some recommendations may not apply to any of the three. Appendix I shows the 
results of this analysis. Once again, it must be recognised that the assessment of 
whether a recommendation contributes to one or other of the categories is subjective, 
being based on an assessment of the content and meaning of the words in the 
recommendation. A generous rather than restrictive view was taken and whenever 
doubt existed as to whether a category applied, the recommendation was assessed as 
applying to the category. 
Twenty-four recommendations were assessed as being within the 'planning' category. 
Fourteen of these recommendations were also assessed as being policy items, with the 
remaining ten addressing detail issues. 
Examination of the cohort of recommendations assessed as both planning and policy 
related, and thus likely to be the more substantive planning related recommendations, 
revealed that they addressed a broad and unrelated range of issues. One proposed 
greater attention to encouraging quality research projects for the International Decade 
for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR) program managed by Emergency 
Management Australia (Rec. I ). One recommended Commonwealth government 
agencies implement disaster recovery plans for their information systems (Rec. 2). 
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Two sought better management and research into earthquakes (Rec. 10, 11 ), while 
another two recommended strategies for the management of rodent plagues (Rec. 12, 
13 ). Legislation covering the management of exotic animal diseases was proposed by 
one recommendation (Rec. 14 ). A further research related recommendation strongly 
emphasised the need to revitalise the study of Australian bushfires (Rec. 27), while 
another two recommended a greater commitment to bushfire control (Rec. 35, 36). 
One recommendation called for the States and the Commonwealth to give more 
attention to mitigating the effects of disasters and emergencies in place of the strong 
response orientation that is currently in place (Rec. 40). Two recommendations 
addressed improvements in Australia's civil defence arrangements at the national 
level (Rec. 43, 44). One recommendation called for the re-vitalisation of the 
Commonwealth Counter Disaster Task Force (Rec. 45), although this 
recommendation is arguably at odds with a finding in the Executive Summary that 
Emergency Management Australia already performs the role recommended for the 
Task Force. This possible conflict is not addressed or considered in the Executive 
Summary or the report proper. 
The cohort of ten planning related recommendations assessed as administrative detail 
covered a wide range of items. They include the use of simulators for training, 
making more use of remote sensing and information dissemination technologies, 
improving maritime disaster planning, better arrangements for overseas assistance, 
planning at the Lucas Heights nuclear reactor, the use of broadcast media, better fire 
suppression on Commonwealth land and EMA's corporate plan. 
Ten recommendations were assessed as being in the 'forecast' category. A cohort of 
six of these were also assessed as being policy related, and hence the more significant 
recommendations. Of this cohort, one sought improved research into natural hazards 
through the IDNDR program (Rec. 1 ), one proposed that a university be nominated as 
a centre for earthquake research (Rec. 11) and another recommended action to 
improve the warning of rodent plagues (Rec. 13). Improved arrangements for bushfire 
research that would give better warning systems was called for by one 
recommendation (Rec. 27), another sought development of a national bushfire 
strategy (Rec. 35) and one recommendation sought improvements to State and 
Commonwealth preparedness arrangements which include forecasting and warning 
systems (Rec. 40). 
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The remrumng four forecast related recommendations assessed as administrative 
detail called for better use of remote sensing and information technology to provide 
forecast and warning systems, better forecasting systems for bushfires and more 
research generally into natural hazards to give an improved ability to forecast hazard 
impacts. 
The 'response' category was the largest with 28 recommendations. Of these, only 
eight were also considered policy matters, and they covered a wide range of issues. 
One sought improvement to the protection of vital Commonwealth records (Rec. 2) 
while another called for a single agency to be responsible for earthquake management 
in each state (Rec. 10). The inclusion of rodent plagues in the Natural Disaster Relief 
Arrangements was recommended (Rec. 1 3  ), as was the adoption of uniform exotic 
animal disease legislation (Rec. 1 4). The states were called on to improve bushfire 
response in one recommendation (Rec. 36), and another called for general 
improvement in response capability through better preparedness (Rec. 40). 
The remaining 20 response oriented recommendations covered many and varied 
minor response issues. They ranged from suggesting Western Australia improve 
bushfire fighting equipment, enhancing remote sensing, uniform qualification 
standards for forensic scientists, increasing standardisation across the emergency 
services generally to conducting water bombing trials. 
On 1 1  May 1995, Senator Crowley, for the Government, tabled its response to the 
report in the Senate, nearly twelve months after the report itself had been tabled 
(Crowley, 1 995, p 332). Appendix 1 also lists the recommendations that were 
accepted by the Government. 
Of the 45 recommendations, the response indicated the Government either accepted, 
endorsed or noted 33 of them, rejecting the remainder either explicitly or implicitly. 
Taken overall, this is an acceptance rate of 73% that could be considered quite good -
nearly three-quarters were supported to a greater or lesser extent. A different picture 
emerges when the analysis of whether recommendations were substantive policy 
issues or matters of administrative detail. Of the 1 8  recommendations considered 
substantive, only ten were supported, an acceptance rate of 55% - considerably lower 
than the overall rate. Conversely, of the 27 administrative recommendations, 24 or 
89% were accepted. Thus, the Government was much more likely to accept or 
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support a recommendation if it involved a matter of administrative detail than if it 
was a matter of substance. 
The Senate noted the report without comment or debate. Senator Crowley obtained 
leave to make further remarks later, but there is no evidence that this occurred. 
A number of conclusions about the conduct and findings of the Senate inquiry can be 
drawn from the above. The first conclusion that can be drawn is that the inquiry adds 
support to the argument that emergency management is an issue of low salience to 
decision-makers and the community. The evidence for this is that the inquiry was 
neither contentious nor able to excite any interest in the Senate when it was proposed 
that it be conducted. Similarly, when both the Childs Report and the Government's 
response were tabled in the Senate, it was an issue unable to spark any level of 
debate. This conclusion is further supported by the comparatively low participation 
rate by Australia's emergency services, the very low participation rate by local 
government and by the few members of the public who participated. While it can be 
understood that the issue is not one that is foremost in the minds of the general public, 
the failure of many emergency services and the vast majority of local governments to 
participate is of great significance. It calls into question the conduct of the inquiry and 
poses a question of whether there is too high a level of complacency in Australia 
regarding our vulnerability to major disasters among local governments and the 
emergency services. 
It can also be concluded that the inquiry has not been able to base its 
recommendations on all of the available information and knowledge in the field of 
emergency management. On the evidence available, it did not undertake any research 
into international best practice in emergency management, nor does there appear to 
have been any effort to obtain input from any of the recognised international experts 
in the field. This omission may have contributed to the inquiry's failure to consider 
issues such as the need for national emergency management legislation, the benefits 
of regular evaluations of national capability, the impact of federalism and the impact 
of economic rationalism. 
The inquiry also appears to have failed to give consideration to the provision of 
emergency management services to remote Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
communities. These communities, that rank among the most disadvantaged in the 
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land, can be severely impacted by natural and man-made hazards, yet are poorly 
served by the emergency services and public policy for mitigating the effects (Yates, 
1 997). There is no evidence that the inquiry gave any significant attention to the 
problems and no recommendations for action were presented in the Childs Report. 
There is considerable evidence that the inquiry was influenced by emergencies and 
events that were occurring during its conduct to the extent that it may have given 
those hazards that were publicly prominent greater attention than they may have 
warranted. The Childs Report and speeches by Senators Panizza and Chapman gave 
prominence to bushfires and rodent plagues, events that received considerable media 
coverage during the inquiry, whilst giving lesser consideration to hazards such as 
floods and tropical cyclones that cause greater losses or hazards such as earthquakes 
that have great potential for large scale destruction. 
Finally, the inquiry failed to address a key issue - how effective and efficient were 
Australia's emergency management arrangements at the time? The Childs Report 
made no attempt to make an assessment of this or to deliver an evaluation of the 
arrangements. This is a critical omission and an opportunity lost. 
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Chapter 4: Evaluation of the Senate Inquiry 
The inquiry into Australia's emergency management arrangements provided a unique 
opportunity for a comprehensive and wide ranging review and assessment of the 
arrangements by a potentially highly influential mechanism - a Senate Committee. 
This chapter evaluates the work of the Senate Committee during the inquiry to enable 
an assessment of its effectiveness to be made. In short, the chapter attempts to 
evaluate whether the Senate Committee was a suitable means to investigate and 
recommend improvements to Australia's emergency management arrangements. It is 
unlikely that assessment of the arrangements by a body as influential as a Senate 
Committee will occur again in the foreseeable future, thus it was important that the 
inquiry was carried out effectively and that it was conducted thoroughly and in depth. 
Although Senate Committees are generally seen as effective means for reviewing 
public policy, Gavin (1994) identified obstacles to effective performance. Citing 
Jaensch's (1992, p 112), she noted three barriers facing parliamentary committees. 
The first problem is that they cannot compel government to comply with their 
recommendations. Although this is strictly true, in practice Senate committees have 
significant power to obtain concessions from government if the issue is one that the 
government needs to obtain Senate support for. This is due to the inability of recent 
federal governments to dominate the Senate or its committees. 
The second problem is the inevitable role party politics plays in the deliberations of 
committees. Regardless of the merits of the situation, Senators take their party 
affiliations with them into the Senate committee room and they may follow a 
particular line regardless of the merits of the situation. This can lead to outcomes 
predicated on party lines, thus weakening the evacuative role of the committees. 
Other writers, however, have pointed to the development of bi-partisanship in Senate 
committees that may be at odds with the public displays in the Senate chamber or the 
media (Hayden, 1991; Young, 1997). 
The third problem noted by Gavin (1994) is the absence of any requirement for the 
House of Representatives to consider reports prepared by Senate committees. This 
can be a significant limitation on the ability of Senate Committees to influence the 
policy process. The need however, for Federal Governments to gain Senate support 
for all legislation acts to moderate this problem. A government that consistently 
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ignored important Senate committee reports, particularly those supported by the 
minor parties, would be likely to have more difficulty gaining Senate approval for 
important legislation. In the current climate where governments are unlikely to 
command a majority in the Senate, pragmatic politics will dictate that governments at 
least consider recommendations made by Senate committees, particularly on issues 
that have high salience. 
Having considered some of the obstacles to effective performance by parliamentary 
committees, the performance of the Senate Committee during its inquiry into 
Australia's emergency management arrangements will be discussed. The first item to 
be addressed is whether the scope of the inquiry was sufficiently wide as to enable it 
to conduct a thorough inquiry. 
The scope and significance of the Senate Committee's inquiry into emergency 
management can be considered by reference to its Terms of Reference: 
The capacity of public sector authorities to plan for, forecast and respond to 
major disasters and large-scale emergencies, fully respecting and utilising the 
skills and capabilities of volunteer organisations. (Foreman, 1992, p 1 882) 
This is a broad inquiry. It is not limited to any one agency or policy. The term 'public 
sector authorities' is very wide, encompassing all public service departments, 
statutory authorities and the defence forces. It is also not limited to the work of these 
authorities at any one level of government. The public sector includes federal, state 
and local government authorities, employing in 1991 1 .7 million Australians or nearly 
30% of the workforce (Davis, Wanna, Warhurst and Weller, 1993, pl 1 0) .  
The inquiry is also broad in its consideration of emergency management as a topic. 
As noted previously (in Chapter 2), emergency management can be divided into four 
phases - prevention, preparedness, response and recovery. The Terms of Reference 
require the Committee to consider planning, forecasting and responding to disasters 
and emergencies. It is evident from the Childs Report (1994) that the Committee 
applied the four-phase model to its inquiry. It included in its considerations issues on 
improving prevention and preparedness, made recommendations to enhance response 
and highlighted the importance of effective recovery management post-impact. 
The scope of the inquiry is further broadened by the specific requirement to address 
the role of volunteers in Australia's emergency management arrangements. The 
Childs Report ( 1994, p 67) noted that this requirement was included to permit 'the 
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Committee to consider the role of volunteers . . . although it is primarily a state 
responsibility.' Inclusion of volunteers has the effect of widening the scope of the 
inquiry well beyond the public sector to include a range of non-government 
philanthropic organisations such as the Red Cross, volunteer sea rescue groups, 
amateur radio groups and the Salvation Army. 
It can be fairly argued, therefore, that the scope of the inquiry is broad, appropriate 
and was not a limiting factor. 
Another way of evaluating the inquiry is to consider salience of the issue being 
inquired into and the way in which the Senate Committee handled it. An issue that 
has high salience with the community and decision-makers will involve different 
pressures and problems than one that has low salience. A high salience issue may be 
politicised with multiple competing interest and lobby groups and there is likely to be 
little difficulty engaging public and media interest. On the other hand, an issue that is 
of low salience may require special efforts to engage community and decision-maker 
interest. 
In theory, emergency management and hence the Senate inquiry should be one of 
significance and of interest to the community. Disasters and emergencies occur across 
Australia and no community can say that it is immune from one form of disaster or 
another. Lives are lost to all forms of natural and man-made hazards, be they deaths 
in motor vehicle accidents, drowning in floods or dying in bushfires every year. In 
addition to the cost in life, significant damage to property, economic loss and 
community disruption is inflicted on numerous communities throughout the nation 
every year. In theory, the inquiry should be a matter of concern to all Australians. In 
practice, however, this is not the case. 
Numerous studies have shown the low salience emergency management has with 
both the general public and elected officials (Rossi, Wright and Weber-Burdin, 1982; 
Petak, 1985; Turner, Nigg and Heller Paz, 1986; Tierney, 1989; Berke and Beatley, 
1992; Schnieder, 1994). These studies indicate that normally there are many other 
issues that communities and decision-makers consider more important than 
emergency management. This is most likely because although disasters and 
emergencies are frequent events when considered across a whole state, they are 
relatively rare events in most communities and for most people (Nielsen and 
43 
Lidstone, 1998). Emergency management generally lacks a sense of immediacy - that 
something needs to be done now - as opposed to the many competing issues such as 
crime or pollution that are highly visible and are directly affecting people and 
communities. Most research notes that the salience of emergency management rises 
immediately after a disaster occurs. The US Federal Emergency Management 
Agency's (undated) guide for emergency program managers even exhorts them to 
capitalise on the occurrence of a disaster to gain support from the community and 
decision-makers for their programs. Other research, however, cautions that even 
recent disaster experience may not be sufficient to raise salience (Nielsen and 
Lidstone, 1998). People may draw the wrong conclusions from their experience -a 
weak tropical cyclone that causes little damage may result in their concluding that all 
cyclones will have the same minor impact (Berry and King, 1998). Consequently, the 
salience of that hazard may be considerably reduced. 
The number of public submissions made to the Committee can infer evidence of the 
salience of the inquiry. While it would be expected that the professional agencies 
involved would make submissions; the general public is only likely to on issues of 
importance to them. The Committee called for public submissions through 
advertisements placed in the national newspapers. Some 85 written submissions were 
made together with a further 55 witnesses at the public hearings. The emergency 
services sector and public sector dominated the written and witness submissions 
generally. Local government submissions and witnesses were at a very low level, four 
and one respectively. Twenty-one non-government organisations made written 
submissions but only three presented as witnesses at the public hearings. 
A similar result occurred with private individuals - twenty-one made written 
submissions with seventeen witnesses (but thirteen of these were South Australian 
farmers pressing a point on rodent plagues). The absence of significant input by local 
government is indicative of two things. Firstly, the Committee could not be said to 
have truly undertaken comprehensive consultation with local government with such a 
low rate of participation. This leads to a conclusion that the Committee did not obtain 
complete information on the views of local government on emergency management, a 
potentially serious omission. Secondly, it supports the research findings that 
emergency management is of low salience to governments generally and in this case 
to Australian local government in particular. The low level of public participation 
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reinforces the research findings of low salience of emergency management with the 
public. 
The problem of low salience should have become apparent to the Senate Committee 
in the course of its inquiry - the sparse public submissions and almost complete 
absence of input from local governments should have prompted the Committee to act 
to increase participation. This is especially true of local government, given the 
important role played by local government in managing emergencies and disasters. 
The fact of low salience does not, however, remove the argument that emergency 
management is, because of the threat posed by natural and man-made hazards, 
inherently an important issue. The same research that indicates its low salience 
equally indicates the strong expectation that government will undertake effective 
mitigation to prevent the loss of life and damage. Community outrage when this 
expectation is not reasonably fulfilled can be intense, as reported by Schneider (1994) 
in her study of government failure in US disasters. 
The effectiveness of the Senate Committee's inquiry can also be assessed through 
consideration of the use made of recognised experts in the emergency management, 
both Australian and international, and of references to best practice in the literature on 
emergency management. 
The Senate Committee made some use of available Australian expertise, although this 
was mostly in the form of presentations and submissions from the emergency 
services. Such submissions, although a vital source of information for the Committee, 
cannot be considered to be independent or detached. Official submissions are more 
likely to 'gild the lily' through promoting the agency's perspective of the problems 
and budgetary deficiencies or they may be tempted to over-emphasis their capacity to 
cope with the impact of disaster. Independent expertise is less likely to be biased in 
this way and so should be given careful consideration during inquiries. Only one 
recognised Australian researcher is listed in the Childs Report (1994) as making a 
written submission, Professor R. Wettenhall, who has written authoritatively on 
emergency management and political issues. 
There is also no evidence that the Committee took into consideration any of the 
significant body of international research into emergency management other than that 
which may have been provided through submissions made to the Committee. The 
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written submission of Mr R. Jones ( 1993), then Director of EMA's Australian 
Emergency Management Institute at Mt Macedon, is available and he refers to the 
importance of the international research, but the Committee appears not to have taken 
the matter further. 
The Childs Report ( 1 994) shows no awareness of many of the issues identified by 
international research into emergency management. Issues such as the low salience of 
emergency management with both government and the general public, the 
incompatibility of military command models in the civil emergency management 
environment and the problems that result when expectations of government's role are 
unable to be fulfilled are not considered in the Childs Report. No awareness of the 
criteria developed by Quarantelli (see Chapter 2) to measure the effectiveness of 
emergency management is apparent in the Childs Report, although any reasonable 
review of the emergency management literature will highlight the work of 
Quarantelli. 
The Committee also does not appear to have undertaken any comparative studies 
between Australian emergency management and overseas practice, thus cutting out a 
potentially useful source of information. The problems that face Australia in 
mitigating natural and man-made hazards are not unique. Countries such as New 
Zealand, the United States and Canada share many of the hazards and have similar 
demographics, culture and geography. The United States and Canada are also federal 
states, so share many of the issues associated with federalism. Furthermore, 
information on emergency management in these countries is readily accessible. As 
has already been noted, most research into emergency management has been 
conducted in North America and many of the publications generated by this research 
are available in the EMA library at the Australian Emergency Management Institute 
at Mt Macedon. It is inconceivable that the Committee was not briefed on the 
capability of the Library during their visit. A request to the US Federal Emergency 
Management Agency for information on North American arrangements by a Senate 
Committee would most likely have resulted in the provision of a great deal of 
material. 
The Committee could, had it so chosen, obtained considerable relevant information 
without great difficulty. There is no evidence that this was done. 
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The Senate Committee's Report also does not demonstrate an awareness of important 
Au_stralian political issues relevant to emergency management. The impact of 
federalism is not considered as an issue, despite the Childs Report itself providing 
examples of the problems of Australia's federal system (see for example its 
discussion of problems with rodent plagues or bushfire management). The absence of 
a national emergency management framework endorsed by federal legislation is not 
considered - yet the importance given to national legislation providing the framework 
in the United States features highly in readily accessible documentation by the US 
Federal Emergency Management Agency. 
Similarly, no consideration was given to the impact of economic rationalism on 
emergency management and the ability of government agencies to provide essential 
services during disasters and emergencies. The debates over economic rationalism 
and new public management are well known and it is reasonable to argue that the 
Committee ought to have been aware of the issue. No reference is made in the Childs 
Report to the reduced capability governments at all levels across Australia have to 
respond to emergencies because resources that they formerly controlled have been 
downsized and contracted out. This is despite evidence that this is a characteristic 
outcome of the economic rationalist approach (Hood and Jackson, 1991). 
Examination of the transcripts of the public hearings demonstrates that the issue was 
brought to the Committee's attention. Sneeuwjagt (1994, pp 1293 - 1297), a senior 
officer of the Western Australian Department of Conservation and Land 
Management, pointed out that : 
Our main concern is the reduction in resources to manage fires, both within 
government agencies and in the [ volunteer fire] brigade arena. This is as a 
result of government cutbacks .... a lot of activities are now just being sent 
out to contract. 
Littleton (1994), a former Director General of EMA, made comments in a similar 
vein, calling for caution and careful thought before the capacity of government 
agencies to respond to emergencies were cut in the name of efficiency. The 
Committee, however, did not take cognisance of the issue and did not discuss it in its 
report or make any recommendations concerning it. 
The final point for considering the effectiveness of the Senate inquiry is to ask what 
the Government did with the recommendations in the Childs Report. If the 
recommendations were largely accepted, then it can be argued that the Committee has 
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been influential in policy development and implementation. If, on the other hand, the 
recommendations were not accepted, then it can be argued that the Committee has 
been ineffective. 
The Childs Report contained 45 recommendations, of which the Government 
accepted, endorsed or noted 33 of them. Although this indicates a reasonably good 
acceptance rate, when the acceptance rate of substantive recommendations, that is 
those that address major issues, is considered the situation changes. Of the 45 
recommendations, only 18 were considered substantive or policy oriented - of these, 
the Government accepted ten or slightly more than half. Reasons given by the 
Government for the non-acceptance of these more important recommendations 
include comments that existing arrangements were equal or better, other action was 
underway or that it was a state issue (Crowley, 1 995). 
The relatively low rate of acceptance by the Government of the significant 
recommendations indicates that the Senate Committee's  inquiry was not particularly 
effective in influencing or changing public policy for emergency management in 
substantive way. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
The Senate Committee's inquiry into Australia's emergency management 
arrangements was a unique opportunity for a comprehensive review of the 
arrangements used by federal, state and local governments to protect the community 
from harm by natural and man-made hazards. It was an opportunity to assess whether 
Australia uses the best practice to mitigate the hazards, whether the resources 
allocated are adequate and whether issues such as economic rationalism and 
federalism contribute in a positive or negative way. 
In the main, the inquiry was an opportunity lost. Although the inquiry did result in 
recommendations for change, a number of which were adopted by the Federal 
Government, the inquiry failed to address or come to grips with significant issues that 
needed to be fully considered if the full potential of the inquiry was to be reached. 
The report of the inquiry released by the Senate Committee did not make any overall 
findings about the state of Australia's emergency management arrangements. There is 
no general evaluation on the nation's overall effort nor is any attempt made to 
conduct a comparative evaluation between Australian arrangements and those used in 
comparable states such as the United States, Canada, New Zealand or the United 
Kingdom. Such a comparative review would have revealed, for example, that many 
countries have a national framework established by legislation. In the United States, 
there is a clear statement of the goal to be achieved - protecting the community from 
the effects of hazards. State and local legislation giving force of law to emergency 
management complement this statutory framework. No such federal legislation exists 
in Australia, nor does the Senate Committee consider the subject. 
Further, the Senate Committee does not appear to have attempted to examine the 
views of recognised international expertise on emergency management. As a field of 
study and thought, it is well developed in North America and there is a wealth of 
knowledge on ways to improve public policy for the management of disasters and 
emergencies. Much of this body of knowledge has been adopted for use in Australia, 
sometimes uncritically, but the Senate Committee did not attempt to access it. The 
use of international expertise coupled with comparative studies of other jurisdictions 
might have enabled the identification of benchmarks against which Australia's 
performance could have been assessed. Such benchmarks and a comparative 
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assessment would have provided a base line to measure future improvements in the 
nation's emergency management arrangements. This would have provided a 
management tool of lasting value. However, this was not done or considered. 
Consideration of the views of recognised experts may have allowed the Committee to 
consider new or competing ideas and concepts for the management of emergencies 
and disasters. Senate committees provide an opportunity for consideration of radical 
concepts that might otherwise be suppressed by the bureaucracy or simple inertia. 
There is no evidence in the Childs Report that this form of debate was even 
considered let alone conducted. The absence of such competing ideas may have 
resulted in the Committee's considerations being heavily influenced by the 
preponderance of submissions from the bureaucracy. The majority of the written and 
verbal submissions were made by either the emergency services themselves or by 
other public sector agencies. The submissions made by these agencies are unlikely to 
have been derogatory to themselves or the arrangements managed by them. 
Consequently, the bulk of the submissions may have been somewhat one-sided. The 
use of independent expertise would have helped to balance the submission made to 
the Committee. 
Despite there being evidence of the problem in the Senate Committee's report, no 
consideration is given to the impact of federalism on Australian disaster management. 
The Childs Report provides examples of problems where the levels of government 
evade responsibility for the management of a problem and, apart from recommending 
that the state governments spend more, fails to consider why this occurs. There would 
have been value in comparing the effectiveness of arrangement in unitary states such 
as New Zealand or the United Kingdom with the arrangements in federal states such 
as Australia, the United States or Canada. This was not done. 
Although the impact of economic rationalism and new public management on the 
community generally should have been known to Committee members and given that 
the problem in respect to emergency management was brought to its attention, no 
effective consideration of the issue was undertaken by the Committee. This is despite 
the specific requirement in the inquiry's Terms of Reference that issues affecting 
volunteers be considered. The reduction in volunteer numbers in rural areas was 
discussed in the Childs Report, but no recommendations to address the problem are 
presented or discussed. This is a serious failure to properly meet the Terms of 
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Reference as well as a missed opportunity to consider strategies to address the 
problem. 
The Senate Committee appears to have been heavily influenced by issues of the 
moment. At the time of the inquiry Australia was being affected by a series of major 
bushfires and a mouse plague, both of which received considerable media attention. 
The mouse plague affected a narrow but organised and vocal segment of the 
community from one state that was able to convince the Senate Committee to include 
a number of recommendations targeted at their particular problem (that were 
subsequently rejected by the Government). Bushfires also received disproportionate 
consideration compared to other equally or more damaging hazards. Had the inquiry 
been conducted during early 1999, it is likely that tropical cyclones, floods and 
hailstorms ( events then in the public eye) would have received greater attention than 
they did in the inquiry. 
During the course of the inquiry, the Senate Committee was unsuccessful in engaging 
many key stakeholders in the consultative process. Less than half the nation's 
emergency services made written submissions; there were very few public 
submissions and only four out of the hundreds of local governments made written 
submissions. Only one local government made a verbal submission. The Senate 
Committee did not engage large groups of 'at-risk' communities and no action was 
taken to address the problem although it should have been obvious to the Committee 
that many stakeholders were not participating. 
The issue certainly failed to ignite any level of political interest. Senate debates on 
establishing the inquiry were limited to voting in favour of the motion to hold it and 
there was no debate on the Government's response to the inquiry's recommendations 
even though most of the significant recommendations were rejected. It sank without 
trace from further consideration by either the Government or Opposition. It could be 
argued that the inquiry had bi-partisan support - support for it to be a non-issue. 
The Senate Committee gave no attention whatsoever to disadvantaged groups in the 
community. Disadvantaged groups are often more vulnerable to disasters because 
they often can only afford to live in more vulnerable areas and lack the skills and 
resources to mitigate the effects of the hazards. In Australia, Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander communities are often at great risk -they are located in hazard prone 
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areas and are ill-prepared. The Senate Committee did not visit any of these 
communities nor did it consider it as an issue. Consequently, no recommendations to 
improve the situation were made. 
The Senate Committee gave considerable attention to administrative issues of lesser 
importance than the major questions of policy. Twenty seven of the forty five 
recommendations addressed matters of administrative detail with only eighteen being 
assessed as policy oriented. Whether the attention to administrative detail was a 
conscious decision or is the result of the lack of technical expertise held by 
Committee members and the failure to consult with independent experts cannot be 
known from the evidence available. 
In addition to the focus on administrative matters, the Senate Committee was not 
particularly successful in gaining Government endorsement of its substantive 
recommendations. Of the 1 8  substantive or policy recommendations, the Government 
only accepted ten, a relatively low acceptance rate of 55%. From the effectiveness 
viewpoint, any inquiry that is only able to gain support for half of its major 
recommendations cannot be considered highly successful. 
As has been noted, the Terms of Reference for the inquiry specifically tasked the 
Senate Committee to be cognisant of the importance of volunteers in Australian 
emergency management. Although one full chapter of the Childs Report discussed 
volunteers and the challenges they face, not one recommendation is presented. This is 
a significant failing in the inquiry given that important problems were revealed and 
are discussed in the Report. 
When assessed against the criteria established in the literature on evaluations, the 
inquiry by the Senate Committee also falls short of the mark. No attempt was made to 
establish what the objectives for Australian emergency management are or ought to 
be. There is no attempt to consider whether established emergency management 
programs are achieving the outcomes that governments might have set. These are all 
considered valid issues for parliamentary committees to investigate and report on to 
hold the executive accountable. The inquiry made no attempt to achieve this. 
There are two primary reasons for the failure of the inquiry to make a substantive 
contribution to the development of Australia's emergency management arrangements. 
Firstly, the issue of emergency management in Australia and overseas is characterised 
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by low salience to both decision-makers and the public other than during the 
immediate aftermath of a disaster when both groups demand prompt solutions to 
often intractable problems. The low salience of the issue resulted in many key 
stakeholders failing to participate effectively in the inquiry and hence provide input 
on problems and possible solutions. 
Secondly, and closely related, is the absence of any key pressure groups attempting to 
place emergency management as an issue on the policy agenda. The absence of an 
active and influential pressure group has been noted in the literature as being a 
significant problem affecting the effectiveness of emergency management 
arrangements. The ability of a small group of grain farmers in South Australia to 
influence the outcome of the inquiry by gaining support for recommendations on 
what is the relatively minor problem of rodent plagues is an example of the potential 
such groups can have. They can be effective in both getting issues onto the policy 
agenda and on raising the salience of the issue. 
The result was an inquiry that was unable to come to grips with a significant number 
of key issues in emergency management in Australia and that did not result in 
significant change to emergency management policy. As a consequence, a unique 
opportunity to reduce the cost ( deaths, injury and financial) of disasters and 
emergencies in Australia was lost. 
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APPENDIX 1 
ANAYLSIS OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE CHILDS REPORT 
Administrative 
No. Recommendations Plan For Forecast Respand To Other Policy? Detail Accepted? 
I Promote IDNDR projects state & Commonwealth y y y y 
2 Improve Commonwealth agency records management y y y 
3 Uniform National Building Codes y y 
4 Simulator Training y y y 
5 ADMIN as model for infomation exchange y y y y y 
6 Technical GIS committee to be formed y y y y 
7 Investigate use of remote sensing technology y y y y 
8 National quals. for forensic scientists y y y 
9 Standardisation among emergency services y y y 
JO Earthquake management - state organisation y y y y 
1 1  Earthquake research y y y 
12  Rodent Plague Commission y y y y 
13  Rodent plagues - NORA inclusion in y y y y 
14 Uniform national Exotic Disease legislation y y y y 
1 5  Review NORA re technological disasters y y y 
16 DSS pamphlet re relief payments y y y 
1 7  Maritime planning to be best practice y y y 
1 8  Chemical plans for maritime spills y y y y 
19 Improve marine charts y y y 
20 Image spectrometer & navigation y y y 
2 1  Compulsory pilotage y y y 
22 Maritime recommendations in international treaties y y y 
23 CAA locate rescue boats at major airports y y y 
24 ANS TO plan for Lucas Heights y y y 
25 Commonwealth Planning y y y 
26 DSS payments to volunteers y y y 
27 Bushfire research y y y y 
28 SMA & WA frequency allocation y y y 
29 Commications standardisation y y y 
30 Water bombing trial y y 
3 1  Emergency use of broadcast stations y y y y 
32 Improve international support coordination y y y 
33 DSS payments to vollies see Rec 26 y y y 
34 Fire suppression on Commonwealth land y y y 
35 Bushfire research & bushfire strategy y y y y y 
36 States to do better with bushfires y y y y 
37 Better equipment for bushfires in WA y y y 
38 EMA focus on core business via Corporate Plan y y y y 
39 EMA & states to do more IDNDR work y y y y 
40 Improve preparedness of states & Commonwealth y y y y 
41 Retain AEMI at Mt Macedon y y 
42 EMA to be relocated to PM's Department y y 
43 Civil defence to go to EMA y y y 
44 Joint civil defence & EM planning role y y y 
45 Role of Commonwealth CD Task Force y y 
24 JO 28 8 1 8  27 33 
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